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A TIPPING POINT IN OHIO: THE PRIMACY MODEL AS A PATH
TO A CONSISTENT APPLICATION OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM
Hon. Pierre H. Bergeron*

I. INTRODUCTION
As cross-winds from the U.S. Supreme Court hint at the potential
toppling of heretofore venerable precedent, we may be entering a new age
of experimentation with and innovation of state constitutional law. This
is, however, certainly not a new idea. In 1977, Justice Brennan issued a
call for state courts to provide greater protections for individual rights
through a reliance on state constitutions.1 In the wake of a rapid expansion
of federal constitutional rights during the Warren Court era, most state
courts simply assumed that state constitutional provisions offered no
more protection than the federal Bill of Rights, blindly accepting the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal rights as coterminous with state
rights. But in Justice Brennan’s view, the “lesson of history” showed that
the opposite was true—the Bill of Rights built upon the foundation of
state constitutional provisions.2 Thus, Justice Brennan maintained that
constitutional decisions by federal courts should be only “persuasive
weight as guideposts,” and then only when they are “logically persuasive
and well-reasoned, paying due regard to precedent and the policies
underlying specific constitutional guarantees.”3 Additionally, Justice
Brennan reasoned that by decoupling state provisions from corresponding
federal provisions, state courts could ensure greater protections by virtue
of the Supreme Court’s inability to review decisions based upon state
law.4 In this way, Justice Brennan posited that individual rights would not
be held hostage to the evolving composition (and accompanying doctrinal
shifts) of the Court.
Although Justice Brennan’s pitch may not have been novel, he is
nonetheless “widely credited [for launching] the so-called New Judicial
Federalism movement.”5 Despite a slow start, state courts eventually
began developing state constitutional doctrine in earnest—an expansion
of legal doctrine that soon became a “noted feature[] of the American
* Judge, Ohio First District Court of Appeals. I have deep gratitude for my law clerks Shannon Price,
Nathan Truitt, Julian Johnson, and Jennifer Brumfield for their excellent assistance on this article. And I
sincerely appreciate the thoughtful feedback from Steven H. Steinglass on an earlier draft of this article.
1. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
2. Id. at 501.
3. Id. at 502.
4. Id. at 501.
5. Richard B. Saphire, Ohio Constitutional Interpretation, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 437, 438 (2004).
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legal landscape.”6 For example, between 1950 and 1969, state courts only
relied on state constitutions ten times to justify protections that exceed the
U.S. Constitution.7 But two decades later, Washington Supreme Court
Justice Robert Utter estimated that the number had skyrocketed to more
than 450.8 Indeed, in a 1986 speech, Justice Brennan declared that the
“[r]ediscovery by state supreme courts of the broader protections afforded
their own citizens by their state constitutions . . . is probably the most
important development in constitutional jurisprudence in our times.”9
Sixth Circuit Chief Judge Jeffrey Sutton recently introduced a new take
on this question in his book 51 Imperfect Solutions.10 Although Chief
Judge Sutton approaches the question from a different vantage point and
with a different analytical structure than Justice Brennan, his underlying
message—that state courts should independently analyze their own
constitutions— echoes part of Justice Brennan’s message. As this concept
gains currency and adherents, state courts are rolling up their sleeves and
delving deeper in interpreting their own constitutions.
As might be expected, however, the development of judicial federalism
does not follow a straight path. Or, as Professor Robert F. Williams
observed, the range of methodologies is sometimes “strikingly wide.”11
While still on the New Hampshire Supreme Court, Justice Souter
highlighted the difficulty in deciding how much weight to give federal
constitutional jurisprudence: “If we place too much reliance on federal
precedent we will render the State rules a mere row of shadows; if we
place too little, we will render State practice incoherent.”12 Striking that
balance often proves to be no easy task.
Although simplistic categories should be resisted, scholars have
identified at least four sequencing approaches that states have adopted
related to judicial federalism: lockstep, interstitial or supplemental, dual
sovereignty, and primacy. A brief review of each methodology—and its
strengths and weaknesses—is helpful to understanding exactly how Ohio
fits within the judicial federalism landscape.
In this article, we use Ohio as a case study to explore the various

6. Robert K. Fitzpatrick, Neither Icarus Nor Ostrich: State Constitutions as an Independent
Source of Individual Rights, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1833, 1840 (2004).
7. John Christopher Anderson, The Mysterious Lockstep Doctrine and the Future of Judicial
Federalism in Illinois, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 965, 968 (2013).
8. Robert F. Utter, State Constitutional Law, the United States Supreme Court, and Democratic
Accountability: Is There a Crocodile in the Bathtub?, 64 WASH. L. REV. 19, 27 (1989).
9. Paul Marcotte, Federalism and the Rise of State Courts, 73 A.B.A. J. 60 (1987).
10. JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2018).
11. Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Methodology in Search & Seizure Cases, 77 MISS.
L.J. 225, 230 (2007).
12. State v. Bradberry, 522 A.2d 1380, 1389 (N.H. 1986).
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approaches to judicial federalism, focusing in particular on its equal
protection and search-and-seizure jurisprudence. These examples reveal
that the Ohio Supreme Court is evolving in its approach to judicial
federalism, but the guidance it offers has not been consistent thus far (as
the court itself acknowledges). As state constitutional issues emerge more
at the forefront of the minds of Ohio lawyers and judges alike, the court
may wish to adopt a primacy model. Such a model would restore the Ohio
Constitution to its rightful prominence, honor Ohio’s constitutional
heritage, and provide clear guidance to litigants.
II. STATE INTERPRETIVE APPROACHES TO THE
“NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM”
A. The Lockstep Approach
The lockstep approach presumptively tethers state constitutional
provisions with federal constitutional jurisprudence.13 Or, as one author
put it: “the state constitutional analysis begins and ends with
consideration of the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the textual
provision at issue.”14 To be fair, the lockstep approach does not contend
that the U.S. Supreme Court is always correct. Instead, it provides a
“presumption of correctness from which the state court should be loathe
to part.”15 Courts tend to justify this approach by the need for uniform
enforcement of criminal laws and the need to avoid confusion, especially
in the Fourth Amendment context.16 Opponents of the lockstep approach
counter that it “assumes a power that has been constitutionally delegated
to others[:] the right of the people to ‘alter’ their constitution.”17 Or as
Justice Utter of the Washington Supreme Court bluntly put it: to adopt the
lockstep approach “is to rewrite our constitution without benefit of a
constitutional convention and to deprive the people of this state of
additional rights, which they adopted in our constitutional convention,
without their consent.”18

13. Hon. Mark S. Coven, The Common Law as Guide to State Constitutional Interpretation, 54
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 279, 294-99 (2021); Thomas G. Saylor, Fourth Amendment Departures and
Sustainability in State Constitutionalism: The 2012 Widener Law & Government Institute Jurist in
Residence Lecture, 22 WIDENER L.J. 1, 12 (2012).
14. Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the New Judicial Federalism,
28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93, 102 (2000).
15. Id.
16. See Saylor, supra note 13, at 13.
17. Ronald K.L. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions—the Montana Disaster, 63 TEX. L. REV.
1095, 1116 (1985).
18. State v. Smith, 814 P.2d 652, 661 (Wash. 1991).
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B. The Interstitial Approach
The interstitial approach differs from the lockstep methodology by
avoiding de facto tethering of the state and federal constitutions, instead
offering a posture of deference—federal priority.19 Under this approach,
state courts “look[] first to the federal constitution to see if it protects the
right.”20 And the court will only examine the state constitution for
potential protections if “the Federal Constitution is not dispositive.” 21 In
other words, if the rights claimant prevails under the U.S. Constitution,
that spells the end of the analysis.22 But if the claim fails under the federal
Constitution, the court turns to the state constitution to inquire further.23
The interstitial approach essentially views the U.S. Supreme Court’s
interpretation of federal constitutional rights as the floor, while ‘the state
court of last resort determines whether supplemental protection is
afforded as a matter of state law.’”24 But this perspective opens this
approach to the criticism that when courts “recognize rights beyond the
national minimum it can seem result oriented.”25 As Justice Stewart
Pollock of the New Jersey Supreme Court retorts, however:
One reason for following the supplemental model is that federal
constitutional rights, as applied to the states through the fourteenth
amendment, establish our national identity. In an increasingly mobile
nation, each of us can take comfort in knowing that, throughout the United
States, the federal constitution protects a core of basic liberties.26

C. The Dual Sovereignty Approach
The dual sovereignty (or dual reliance) approach requires state courts
to “discuss or rely upon both federal and state law in forming their
decisions,” and thus “weave[] the two constitutions together.”27
Commentators criticize this approach for creating “problems in
identifying decisions that were based on adequate and independent state

19. Coven, supra note 13.
20. Nathan Sabourin, We’re from Vermont & We Do What We Want: A “Re”-Examination of the
Criminal Jurisprudence of the Vermont Supreme Court, 71 ALB. L. REV. 1163, 1167-68 (2008).
21. Id. at 1168.
22. Williams, supra note 11.
23. Id.
24. Sabourin, supra note 20, at 1168 (quoting Jason J. Legg, The Green Mountain Boys Still Love
Their Freedom: Criminal Jurisprudence of the Vermont Supreme Court, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1799, 1805
(1997)).
25. Williams, supra note 11, at 241.
26. Stewart G. Pollock, Adequate & Independent State Grounds as a Means of Balancing the
Relationship Between State & Federal Courts, 63 TEX. L. REV. 977, 986 (1985).
27. Sabourin, supra note 20, at 1167; Coven, supra note 13, at 295, n.140.
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grounds.”28 In other words, the dual sovereignty approach may generate
decisions that muddy the distinction between the state and federal
constitutional law. Not only are these ambiguous decisions open to review
by the Supreme Court if the state court fails to clarify the basis of the
decision as independent state grounds, but these decisions offer unclear
guidance on the development of state constitutional law.29 Recognizing
this problem, advocates of the dual sovereignty approach encourage state
courts to precisely distinguish between the state and federal analyses in
their opinions.30 Advocates argue that such a distinction would allow state
courts to participate in “the discussion and evolution of federal—as well
as their own state’s—constitutional law.”31
D. The Primacy Approach
The primacy approach represents the antithesis to the interstitial
approach. Under the primacy approach, courts begin with the state
constitutional analysis, and only turn to the federal analysis if state law
does not protect the interest at stake.32 Advocates of this approach explain
that the state constitutional analysis is “logically prior to review” under
the federal constitution33 and, thus, “all questions of state law” should be
considered before turning to the federal analysis.34 Some advocates of this
approach even suggest that “subconstitutional” state issues should be
addressed before turning to the federal issues. For example, one Oregon
court explained that “[a]ll issues should first be addressed on a
subconstitutional level. Courts then should consider any remaining issues
under the Oregon Constitution. Finally, if no state law, including the state
constitution, resolves the issues, courts then should turn for assistance to
the Constitution of the United States.”35
Justice Stevens extols the primacy approach as the best framework for
“‘facilitat[ing] [the] independent role of state constitutions and state
courts in our federal system.’”36 Unlike the lockstep approach, the
primacy approach requires courts to resort to the state constitution, rather
28. Williams, supra note 11, at 243.
29. See Jason J. Legg, The Green Mountain Boys Still Love Their Freedom: Criminal
Jurisprudence of the Vermont Supreme Court, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1799, 1803-04 (1997).
30. Williams, supra note 11, at 243.
31. Id.
32. Sabourin, supra note 20; Coven, supra note 13.
33. Williams, supra note 11, at 239 (quoting Hon. Hans A. Linde, Without “Due Process”:
Unconstitutional Law in Oregon, 49 OR. L. REV. 125, 135 (1970)).
34. Id. at 239-40 (quoting State v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316, 1318 (Or. 1983)).
35. Id. (quoting State v. Tompkin, 143 P.3d 530, 534 (Or. 2006)).
36. Id. at 241 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 704 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
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than defer to federal courts. Unlike the interstitial approach, the primacy
approach places the state constitution at the center of the analysis, rather
than giving it a secondary role triggered only if federal law fails to resolve
the matter. And unlike the dual sovereignty approach, the primacy
approach “lead[s] state courts to be clearer about whether they intend their
decisions to rest on adequate and independent state grounds,” thus
ensuring that the state’s constitutional analysis does not collapse into the
federal analysis.37
III. JUDICIAL FEDERALISM IN OHIO
With the backdrop on judicial federalism approaches in mind, let’s take
a closer look at Ohio. Over the years, Ohio courts have alternated between
versions of the four methodologies discussed above but never
conclusively settled on any single approach. Ohio’s experience in
vacillating between approaches is by no means unique or surprising—
many other states have witnessed similar experimentation.38 This Part
outlines the history of judicial federalism in Ohio.
A. Early Adherence to Lockstep Interpretation
For decades, Ohio resisted the allure of Justice Brennan’s call for a new
judicial federalism, refusing several fairly blunt invitations from the U.S.
Supreme Court to invoke state constitutional law as a response to reversal
on federal constitution claims. For example, in the 1975 case Forest City
Enterprises v. Eastlake, the Ohio Supreme Court initially held that a city
charter amendment requiring an extraordinary majority via referendum to
enact zoning changes violated federal due process guarantees by
impermissibly delegating legislative power.39 The U.S. Supreme Court
reversed, emphasizing a provision of the Ohio Constitution that reserved
the power of referendum to the people of each Ohio municipality.40 A
referendum, the Court held, could not itself be “characterized as a
delegation of power.”41 However, if a party “consider[ed] the referendum
result . . . to be unreasonable, the zoning restriction [wa]s open to
challenge in state court, where the scope of the state remedy available to

37. Id. at 240.
38. See, e.g., Paul Avelar & Keith Diggst, Economic Liberty and the Arizona Constitution: A
Survey of Forgotten History, 49 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 355 (2017).
39. Forest City Enter. v. Eastlake, 324 N.E.2d 740 (Ohio 1975) [hereinafter Eastlake I].
40. Eastlake v. Forest City Enter., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 673 (1976) (“In framing a state constitution,
the people of Ohio specifically reserved the power of referendum to the people of each municipality within
the State.”).
41. Id. at 672.
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respondent would be determined as a matter of state law.”42
On remand, the Ohio Supreme Court fumbled its opportunity to invoke
due process guarantees under the Ohio Constitution and, at least, reassess
the city’s charter amendment. After all, Eastlake I explicitly recognized
that “[z]oning provisions such as that in Eastlake’s charter have a single
motive, and that is to exclude, to build walls against the ills, poverty,
racial strife . . . to perpetuate the de facto divisions in our society between
black and white, rich and poor.”43 The U.S. Supreme Court’s “pointed
reference to state court relief” was interpreted by contemporary scholars
as an invitation for Ohio—and other states—to take charge of urban
zoning issues.44 Instead, the Ohio Supreme Court issued a six-paragraph
opinion that made no reference whatsoever to any specific provision of
the Ohio Constitution. Without discussion, the court proclaimed that its
decision in Eastlake I simply “must be overruled since we perceive no
state due-process constitutional questions which, under this record, we
would choose to decide in a manner other than that mandated by the
opinion on remand.”45
Another example of Ohio’s early distaste for judicial federalism is
embodied in the flagship First Amendment case, Zacchini v. ScrippsHoward Broadcasting Co.46 In that case, Hugo Zacchini—a “human
cannonball”—protested a nightly news broadcast showing his entire,
fifteen-second performance.47 The Ohio Supreme Court recognized Mr.
Zacchini’s right of publicity in his performance, but held that, as a
member of the press, Scripps was privileged to record and show the
performance as a matter of public concern.48 “No fixed standard,” the
court declared, could be formulated to “bar the press from reporting or
depicting either an entire occurrence or an entire discrete part of a public
performance . . . [without] unduly restrict[ing] the ‘breathing room’ in
reporting which freedom of the press requires.”49
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court began its opinion by considering
whether it even had jurisdiction over the state right-of-publicity claim. 50
The Court noted:
Had the Ohio court rested its decision on both state and federal grounds,

42. Id. at 677.
43. Eastlake I, 324 N.E.2d 740 at 749.
44. Lawrence Gene Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v.
Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARV. L. REV. 1373, 1420 (1978).
45. Forest City Enter. v. Eastlake, 356 N.E.2d 499, 500 (Ohio 1976).
46. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 351 N.E.2d 454 (Ohio 1976).
47. Id. at 455.
48. Id. at 461.
49. Id.
50. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
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either of which would have been dispositive, we would have had no
jurisdiction. But the opinion, like the syllabus, did not mention the Ohio
Constitution, citing instead this Court’s First Amendment cases as
controlling. It appears to us that the decision rested solely on federal
grounds. That the Ohio court might have, but did not, invoke state law does
not foreclose jurisdiction here.51

Having resolved the jurisdictional quandary, the Court reversed the
Ohio Supreme Court’s finding of First Amendment privilege for
Scripps.52 It crafted exactly the fixed standard the Ohio Supreme Court
declared unworkable, holding that “[w]herever the line in particular
situations is to be drawn between media reports that are protected and
those that are not, we are quite sure that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments do not immunize the media when they broadcast a
performer’s entire act without his consent.”53 The Court went out of its
way to emphasize that its new standard did not dictate the Ohio Supreme
Court’s reading of the Ohio Constitution: “the State of Ohio may as a
matter of its own law privilege the press in the circumstances of this case
[].”54
Again, the Ohio Supreme Court demurred this invitation to apply state
law. In a terse, per curiam opinion, the court quoted several paragraphs
from the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling, before concluding that it
“discern[ed] no compelling reason . . . to render a constitutional
declaration beyond that which the majority of the United States Supreme
Court announced in reviewing this cause.”55 It remanded the case to the
trial court, without instructions on how (or whether) Section 11, Article I
of the Ohio Constitution ought to apply.56 The majority’s lack of analysis
on the state constitutional issue did not go unnoticed. Justice Celebrezze
bemoaned the court’s “abidcat[ion of] its role as the ultimate arbiter of
Ohio law,” arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court’s “entire act” standard
was both unclear and “susceptible to easy circumvention.”57 And Justice
Brown chastised the majority for “a transparent attempt to avoid drawing
the boundaries of a press privilege.”58 Indeed, the majority’s avoidance of
state constitutional interpretation yielded lasting effects: the Ohio
Supreme Court did not identify any significant divergence between the
51. Id. at 568.
52. Id. at 578-79.
53. Id. at 574-75.
54. Id. at 578-79.
55. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 376 N.E.2d 582, 583 (Ohio 1978).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 584 (Celebrezze, J., concurring).
58. Id. at 585-88 (Brown, J., concurring) (“I do not agree with the majority that there is no
alternative to remanding the instant cause to the trial court without providing state constitutional
guidelines.”).
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Ohio Constitution and the federal First Amendment until two decades
later.59 This problem attains greater significance given the substantial
textual differences between the First Amendment and its Ohio
counterparts.60
Eastlake, Zacchini, and other, similar cases sparked criticism from
scholars as well as members of the Ohio courts. In a 1984 article, legal
scholars Mary Cornelia Porter and G. Alan Tarr lamented the Ohio
Supreme Court’s “record under the new judicial federalism” as consistent
with the state’s “fail[ure] to develop a body of state civil liberties law.”61
The Ohio Supreme Court, Porter and Tarr hypothesized, was “neither
inclined, nor apparently equipped, to strike out and hold its own” among
its fellow federal and state courts.62 The court’s reluctance to embrace its
own lawmaking power caused it to “ignore[] opportunities to follow the
lead of other courts in developing state constitutional law,” with the result
that Ohio constitutional law remained woefully underdeveloped.63
B. Arnold and Robinette: An Interstitial Approach?
The Ohio Supreme Court’s first reference approving the new judicial
federalism appeared in the 1993 case Arnold v. City of Cleveland, where
gun-owners challenged the constitutionality of a municipal ban on
59. See Humphrey v. Lane, 728 N.E.2d 1039, 1044 (Ohio 2000) (“It was the Smith decision that
marked the divergence of federal and Ohio protection of religious freedom.”).
60. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.”), with OHIO CONST. art. I, § 11 (“Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his
sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of the right; and no law shall be passed to
restrain or abridge the liberty of speech, or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel, the truth
may be given in evidence to the jury, and if it shall appear to the jury, that the matter charged as libelous
is true, and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted.”), and
OHIO CONST. art. I, § 3 (“The people have the right to assemble together, in a peaceable manner, to consult
for their common good; to instruct their representatives; and to petition the general assembly for the
redress of grievances.”), and OHIO CONST. art. I, § 7 (“All men have a natural and indefeasible right to
worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own conscience. No person shall be compelled
to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or maintain any form of worship, against his consent;
and no preference shall be given, by law, to any religious society; nor shall any interference with the rights
of conscience be permitted. No religious test shall be required, as a qualification for office, nor shall any
person be incompetent to be a witness on account of his religious belief; but nothing herein shall be
construed to dispense with oaths and affirmations. Religion, morality, and knowledge, however, being
essential to good government, it shall be the duty of the general assembly to pass suitable laws to protect
every religious denomination in the peaceable enjoyment of its own mode of public worship, and to
encourage schools and the means of instruction.”).
61. Mary Cornelia Porter & G. Alan Tarr, The New Judicial Federalism and the Ohio Supreme
Court: Anatomy of a Failure, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 143, 154-55 (1984).
62. Id. at 157.
63. Id. at 150, 154 (“The court not only has failed to develop a body of state civil liberties law but
has little experience in interpreting the state constitution.”).
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“assault weapons” within the city of Cleveland.64 At the time, the Second
Amendment had not yet been incorporated against the states,65 and federal
law recognized no individual right to bear arms.66 The plaintiffs
maintained that Cleveland’s municipal ban violated Section 4, Article I
of the Ohio Constitution, which provides that “[t]he people have a right
to bear arms for their defense and security.”
In recognizing an individual, constitutional right to bear arms in Ohio,
the Ohio Supreme Court announced its intention to “join[] the growing
trend in other states . . . [and treat] the Ohio Constitution [a]s a document
of independent force.”67 The federal constitution, the court explained,
“provides a floor beneath which state court decisions may not fall . . .
[but] state courts are unrestricted in according greater civil liberties and
protections to individuals and groups.”68 The court embarked on an
examination of the history of Section 4, Article I, as well as the unique
syntax of the Ohio provision as compared to the federal Second
Amendment.69 Finally, it concluded that Ohio’s individual right to bear
arms was subject to reasonable regulation, and the assault-weapon ban in
question constituted “a reasonable exercise of the municipality’s police
power.”70
Arnold represented a substantial departure from the Ohio Supreme
Court’s previous cases implicating judicial federalism—so much that
commentators have characterized the opinion as the court’s “manifesto
for its own Ohio constitutional emancipation.”71 The Arnold court even
cited Porter and Tarr’s “Anatomy of a Failure” article, offering a not-sosubtle acknowledgment of its previous avoidance of state constitutional
interpretation.72 For proponents of the new judicial federalism, Arnold’s
promise to treat the Ohio Constitution as an independent source of rights
and liberties rendered the decision the “poster child for judicial federalism
in Ohio.”73 Of course, Arnold did not clarify exactly how the Ohio courts
64. Arnold v. City of Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163 (Ohio 1993).
65. Id. at 167 (“We note that the Second Amendment has not yet been held to be applicable to the
states.”).
66. Id. at 166 (“The question as to whether individuals have a fundamental right to bear arms has,
seemingly, been decided in the negative under the Second Amendment to the United States
Constitution.”).
67. Id. at 169.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 173.
71. Saphire, supra note 5, at 450.
72. Arnold, 616 N.E.2d at 168, n.8 (“It appears that the Ohio Supreme Court has been reluctant
to use the Ohio Constitution to extend greater protection to the rights and civil liberties of Ohio citizens.
When presented with opportunities to do so, this court has not, on most occasions, used the Ohio
Constitution as an independent source of constitutional rights.”).
73. Saphire, supra note 5, at 451. See also Robert F. Williams, The New Judicial Federalism in
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would approach future cases involving parallel federal and state claims—
but it certainly appeared to abandon the court’s previous adherence to
lockstep interpretation.
Yet no sooner did the Ohio Supreme Court announce its adherence to
some version of new judicial federalism than it began to backpedal. In a
1995 case, State v. Robinette, the court confronted a motion to suppress
evidence under both Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution and the
federal Fourth Amendment.74 Initially, the court held that both the Ohio
Constitution and the Fourth Amendment required that “citizens stopped
for traffic offenses be clearly informed by the detaining officer when they
are free to go after a valid detention, before an officer attempts to engage
in a consensual interrogation.”75 Despite its passing reference to the Ohio
Constitution, the decision relied almost entirely on federal law and did not
provide independent analysis of the Ohio constitutional provisions at
issue, opening the door to review by the United States Supreme Court.76
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that no such
bright-line rule for consensual interrogation existed under the Fourth
Amendment.77 As in Zacchini, the Supreme Court remanded the case with
an explicit invitation for the Ohio Supreme Court to “clarify that its
instructions to law enforcement officers in Ohio find adequate and
independent support in state law.”78 Observers might have hoped that,
post-Arnold, the Ohio Supreme Court would affirm its holding in
Robinette I on state constitutional grounds—particularly given Robinette
I’s insistence that its rule was mandated by the Ohio Constitution in
addition to the Fourth Amendment.
No such luck. Instead, invoking the United States Constitution as “the
primary mechanism to safeguard an individual’s rights,” the Robinette II
court held that “Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution affords
protections that are coextensive with those provided by the Fourth
Amendment.”79 It also announced the principle that, in future cases, the
court should “harmonize our interpretation of Section 14, Article I of the
Ohio Constitution with the Fourth Amendment, unless there are

Ohio: The First Decade, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 415, 417 (2004) [hereinafter Williams, New Judicial
Federalism] (“Arnold has become the standard citation supporting the independent force of the Ohio
constitution.”).
74. State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695 (Ohio 1995) [hereinafter Robinette I].
75. Id. at 696.
76. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 37 (1996) (“Although the opinion below mentions Art. I, §
14, of the Ohio Constitution in passing . . . , the opinion clearly relies on federal law nevertheless. Indeed,
the only cases it discusses or even cites are federal cases, except for one state case which itself applies the
Federal Constitution.”).
77. Id. at 39.
78. Id. at 45 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
79. State v. Robinette, 685 N.E.2d 762, 766, 771 (Ohio 1997) [hereinafter Robinette II].
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persuasive reasons to find otherwise.”80 It left the question of what might
represent a “persuasive reason” to diverge from Supreme Court precedent
for another day.
The standard announced in Robinette II approaches an interstitial
model of judicial federalism—which, for all of its potential flaws, would
at least require principled analysis of Ohio constitutional claims when
raised.81 But it also holds the seeds of what Robert F. Williams refers to
as “prospective lockstepping,” in which a state court “announces that not
only for the instant case, but also in the future, it will interpret the state
and federal clauses the same.”82 Prospective lock-stepping raises serious
constitutional problems, not least of which is the possibility of antidemocratic, judicial amendment of the state constitution.83 It may come
of little surprise, then, that the Ohio Supreme Court has not consistently
followed Robinette II—leaving a conspicuous void as to which
interpretive model, if any, actually governs judicial federalism in the
state.84
C. Judicial Federalism in Ohio’s Modern Search-and-Seizure
and Equal Protection Jurisprudence
To appreciate some of the nuance between these approaches, and why
it matters, we drill down on the Ohio Supreme Court’s post-Robinette
approach to judicial federalism in two areas of the law: search-and-seizure
and equal protection. This Section addresses each area in turn, with an
eye toward our later, comparative analysis of judicial federalism in other
states.
1. Search-and-Seizure
Despite Arnold’s purported embrace of the independent force of the
Ohio Constitution, Robinette II reaffirmed the Ohio Supreme Court’s
intent to “harmonize” its search-and-seizure case law with that of the
United States Supreme Court. And for roughly a decade, that was exactly
what the court did. In State v. Murrell, for example, the court overruled a
1992 case that had held a police officer’s traffic-stop search of a small,
closed container inside the glove compartment of a car unconstitutional
80. Id. at 767.
81. Unlike the lockstep approach, the interstitial approach secures a role for the state constitution
in the constitutional analysis. See supra Part II.A-D. And unlike the dual sovereignty approach, the role
of the state constitutional analysis is distinct, rather than ambiguously weaved into the federal
constitutional analysis. Id.
82. Williams, New Judicial Federalism, supra note 73, at 434.
83. Id. at 435.
84. See supra Part II.C.
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on state and federal grounds.85 The Murrell court explained its decision
to roll back search-and-seizure protections as a product of the principle
that “Section 14 Article I and the Fourth Amendment should be
harmonized whenever possible.”86 So far as the United States Supreme
Court continued to whittle away Fourth Amendment protections, the Ohio
Supreme Court appeared willing to go along for the ride.
Only in 2003 did the court finally recognize a substantive, postRobinette II distinction between the search-and-seizure protections of the
Ohio Constitution and the Fourth Amendment. In State v. Brown, a
defendant claimed that his arrest for the minor misdemeanor of
jaywalking violated Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, and
that evidence seized in a search incident to that arrest must be
suppressed.87 Because the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2001 holding in Atwater
v. Lago Vista clearly allowed the arrest under the Fourth Amendment,88
the defendant’s arguments hinged exclusively on state law.89 Citing
Arnold and its own, pre-Atwater precedent, the Ohio Supreme Court
concluded that the Ohio Constitution “provide[d] greater protection than
the Fourth Amendment” specifically “against warrantless arrests for
minor misdemeanors.”90 In this one, discrete area, the court rejected stateto-federal harmony and chose to stand its ground. But at the same time,
the court pointed to no textual, historical, or purposive differences that
would suggest how to demarcate such distinctions in future cases.
Contemporary commentators on the Brown decision predicted it would
be an outlier to Ohio’s general rule of search-and-seizure
harmonization.91 However, at least one subsequent Ohio Supreme Court
decision followed Brown, expanding the reach of the state’s search-andseizure constitutional protections.92 In State v. Brown II (unrelated to
State v. Brown) the court confronted the issue of whether an officer’s lack
of statutory authorization for a traffic stop resulted in a violation of the
Ohio Constitution.93 Federal Supreme Court jurisprudence permitted the
stop as long as the officer had probable cause, and so—like Brown—the

85. State v. Murrell, 764 N.E.2d 986 (Ohio 2002).
86. Id.
87. State v. Brown, 792 N.E.2d 175 (Ohio 2003).
88. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (“If an officer has probable cause to
believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may,
without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.”).
89. Brown, 792 N.E.2d at 176-77.
90. Id. at 178.
91. Marianna Brown Bettman, Ohio Joins the New Judicial Federalism Movement: A Little Toing and a Little Fro-ing, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 491, 500 (2004).
92. See State v. Brown, 39 N.E.3d 496 (Ohio 2015).
93. Id. at 447.
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case hinged on the state constitutional issue.94 In its second meaningful
departure from federal search-and-seizure precedent, the Ohio Supreme
Court concluded that “Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution
affords greater protection than the Fourth Amendment against searches
and seizure conducted by members of law enforcement who lack
authority to make an arrest,” and held the stop resulting in defendant’s
arrest unconstitutional.95 The majority offered no reference whatsoever to
Robinette II, instead relying heavily on Brown and Arnold for the
proposition that state constitutional guarantees could and did exceed the
scope of the Fourth Amendment.96
In dissent, Justice French emphasized the contradictions between the
court’s modern approach and the standard set forth in Robinette II. She
criticized the Brown II majority for “creat[ing] a new state constitutional
right . . . without carefully examining the language of the Ohio
Constitution to justify its departure from federal law.”97 Under Robinette
II, Justice French insisted, the majority was obliged to follow Fourth
Amendment precedent “[a]bsent compelling reasons to differ.”98 Because
the majority did not identify those “compelling reasons,” it had no basis
to depart from federal precedent.99
Since Brown II, the Ohio Supreme Court seems to have gravitated
towards Justice French’s approach to Article I, Section 14. In Ohio v.
Jordan (decided in 2021), for example, the court held that, absent
“persuasive reasons” for enlarging the Fourth Amendment’s protections,
“Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution provid[es] the same
protections as the Fourth Amendment.”100 That said, the court has never
foreclosed the possibility that Article I, Section 14 secures broader
protections than the Fourth Amendment and has recently appeared to
invite practitioners to raise such a claim.101 But, as we explore below,
without clearer guidance from the court, practitioners may be reluctant to
bring such claims without an overarching analytical structure through
which to filter them.
2. Equal Protection
In typical lockstep fashion, the Ohio Supreme Court declared in 1975

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 450.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 451 (French, J., dissenting).
Id. at 456.
Id.
Ohio v. Jordan, No. 2020-0495, slip op. at 14 (Ohio Nov. 9, 2021).
See infra Part IV.B.
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that the “limitations placed upon governmental action by the Equal
Protection Clauses of the Ohio and United States constitutions are
essentially identical.”102 The court affirmed in the 1998 case Am. Ass’n.
of Univ. Professors v. Central State Univ. its belief that the state and
federal clauses are “functionally equivalent,” and “the standards for
determining violations . . . are essentially the same under state and federal
law.”103 Fifty-five years later, this lockstep approach to equal protection
in Ohio is still good law—sort of.104 Ohio’s approach to judicial
federalism and equal protection claims is remarkable in two ways: first,
because of its insistence that it has never changed; and second, because
of the growing number of dissents and concurrences produced by its
evolution.105
To this day, the Ohio Supreme Court has never overruled its
declaration of “functional equivalence” between state and federal equal
protection doctrine.106 In a 2016 case, State v. Noling, a majority of the
Ohio Supreme Court cited Am. Ass’n. of Univ. Professors for the
proposition that “the federal and Ohio Equal Protections are to be
construed and analyzed identically.”107 It struck down a statute limiting
the ability of capital offenders to appeal denial of post-conviction DNA
testing, citing state and federal precedent interchangeably.108 In a 2018
case, Stolz v. J & B Steel Erectors, the court applied the equivalent of
federal rational basis review to reject a state equal protection claim in just
two brief paragraphs of discussion.109 Likewise, in the 2020 case Sherman
v. Ohio Public Employees Retirement System, the court invoked federal
precedent to articulate the motion to dismiss standard for an equal
protection claim.110

102. Kinney v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 322 N.E.2d 880 (Ohio 1975).
103. Am. Ass’n. of Univ. Professors, Cent. State Univ. Chapter v. Cent. State Univ., 717 N.E.2d
286 (Ohio 1999) [hereinafter Am. Ass’n. of Univ. Professors II].
104. In Westlaw, for example, Am. Ass’n. of Univ. Professors II is flagged as “Called into Doubt”
by State v. Mole—but never explicitly contradicted or overruled. See State v. Mole, 74 N.E.3d 368 (Ohio
2016).
105. See Mole, 74 N.E.3d at 376 (discussing the tendency of judicial federalism decisions to
provoke “vigorous dissents”).
106. See Sherman v. Ohio Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 169 N.E.3d 602, 608, n.2 (Ohio 2020) (treating
the equal protection provisions of the Ohio and federal Constitutions as functionally equivalent).
107. State v. Noling, 75 N.E.3d 141 (Ohio 2016).
108. Id.
109. Stolz v. J & B Steel Erectors, Inc., 122 N.E.3d 1228, 1235 (Ohio 2018). See also id. at 123839 (Fischer, J., concurring) (explaining that the majority’s application of rational basis review properly
follows the court’s “functional equivalents” precedent).
110. Sherman, 169 N.E.3d at 608. See id. at 608, n.2 (“Although Wroblewski refers to the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the parties take the
position that the federal Equal Protection Clause is the functional equivalent of the Equal Protection
Clause in the Ohio Constitution in the context of this case.”).
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Yet in the midst of cases that seemingly continued to apply a lockstep
approach to equal protection claims, the court also decided State v. Mole:
one of its most ringing endorsements of judicial federalism since
Arnold.111 Discussed at length in Part IV, Mole involved a 2016 challenge
to a statute criminalizing sexual conduct between a minor and a peace
officer who was more than two years older than the minor.112 The
defendant police officer argued that the statute violated equal protection
guarantees of both the Ohio Constitution and the United States
Constitution. The court agreed, and in doing so, provided a nineparagraph chronicle of its “inconsistent[]” response to “the hortatory call
to the new federalism.”113 Emphasizing cases where it had departed from
federal First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment precedent, the court
concluded:
We once again reaffirm that this court, the ultimate arbiter of the meaning
of the Ohio Constitution, can and will interpret our Constitution to afford
greater rights to our citizens when we believe that such an interpretation is
both prudent and not inconsistent with the intent of the framers. We also
reaffirm that we are not confined by the federal courts’ interpretations of
similar provisions in the federal Constitution any more than we are
confined by other states’ high courts’ interpretations of similar provisions
in their states’ constitutions. . . . Federal opinions do not control our
independent analyses in interpreting the Ohio Constitution, even when we
look to federal precedent for guidance.
We can and should borrow from well-reasoned and persuasive precedent
from other states and the federal courts, but in so doing we cannot be
compelled to parrot those interpretations. Instead, we embrace the notion
that we may, and should, consider Ohio’s conditions and traditions in
interpreting our own state’s constitutional guarantees. In doing so, we are
cognizant that “the individual-rights guarantees of the Bill of Rights were
based on pre-existing state constitutional guarantees, not the other way
around.” This is particularly important to remember whenever the United
States Supreme Court’s decisions dilute or underenforce important
individual rights and protections.114

The Mole court cited multiple articles by Chief Judge Sutton and
ultimately invalidated the statute on both state and federal grounds.115 As
sweeping as this language was, it only commanded three votes and thus
represents a plurality opinion rather than a majority (leaving more
111. State v. Mole, 74 N.E.3d 368, 372 (Ohio 2016).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 375-77.
114. Id. at 376 (quoting Jeffrey S. Sutton, Why Teach—And Why Study—State Constitutional Law,
34 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 165, 167 (2009)).
115. Id. at 376, 389.
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lingering questions than answers, as we’ll see).
At first glance, Mole appears to represent a clear victory for advocates
of judicial federalism. But recall that Noling, Stolz, and Sherman all
followed Mole—and each continued to employ some form of the
“functional equivalents” standard. In his 2018 Stolz concurrence, Justice
Fischer highlighted this lack of uniformity in Ohio’s equal protection
jurisprudence as a reason for the court to “thoroughly reexamine the Ohio
and federal Equal Protection Clauses” and question “whether they are
indeed functional equivalents.”116 The simple fact that the Equal
Protection Clause of the Ohio Constitution predates the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, Justice Fischer explained, means
that “there can be no legitimate argument that the Ohio Equal Protection
Clause was the ‘functional equivalent’ of the federal Equal Protection
Clause for the first 17 years that the Ohio clause existed.”117 To the extent
that the ‘functional equivalents’ standard imposed a prospective lockstep
approach, Justice Fischer maintained that the resulting “‘upward
delegation’ of [the Ohio Supreme Court’s] duty to interpret the Ohio
Constitution is improper under our federal system and unconstitutional
under the Ohio Constitution.”118
There are many good reasons to understand Ohio’s Article I, Section 2
Equal Protection Clause as substantively distinct from federal equal
protection. Not only is the Ohio provision “textually distinct,” but it also
“emanat[es] from a different period in history, and, undoubtedly, [is]
aimed at a different set of concerns from those at which the federal
constitutional provision was aimed after the civil war.”119 The proper
scope of equal protection under the Ohio Constitution is, of course, not
the subject of this paper—but the uncertainty surrounding that scope is a
clear byproduct of the court’s oscillation between lockstep and nonlockstep models of judicial federalism. Until the court provides more
clarity about which model of judicial federalism it will follow, it will
continue to engender confusion for judges and practitioners alike.
IV. INCREASING TENSION AND THE NEED FOR A CONSISTENT
INTERPRETIVE APPROACH
The Ohio Supreme Court’s inconsistent approach to judicial federalism
is not just theoretically frustrating but practically significant for judges
who have to apply—and litigants who seek to enforce—state
116. Stolz v. J & B Steel Erectors, Inc., 122 N.E.3d 1228, 1238 (Ohio 2018) (Fischer, J.,
concurring).
117. Id. at 1236.
118. Id. at 1239.
119. Williams, New Judicial Federalism, supra note 73, at 429.
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constitutional law. These inconsistencies, and the transforming
composition of the federal judiciary (particularly the U.S. Supreme
Court), present us with a tipping point, where Ohio courts should re-assess
the relationship between state and federal constitutional law.
A. Challenges for Judges: A Closer Look at State v. Mole
Closer examination of the Ohio Supreme Court’s various Mole
opinions helps illustrate the confusion that Ohio’s inconsistent embrace
of judicial federalism creates for Ohio judges. Mole espoused at least
three different interpretive methods for judicial federalism claims. First,
in the lead opinion, Chief Justice O’Connor announced a seemingly new
standard for when the court will invoke independent state grounds in its
equal protection (and perhaps all judicial federalism) decisions: “[T]his
court . . . can and will interpret our Constitution to afford greater rights to
our citizens when we believe that such an interpretation is both prudent
and not inconsistent with the intent of the [Ohio] framers.”120 This
“prudent-and-not-inconsistent” standard at least provides some guidance
to lower courts on how to evaluate a claim implicating both state and
federal constitutional rights: it resembles an interstitial approach and
indicates that policy considerations and historical record are paramount.
The trouble is that, despite Mole’s insistence on the primacy of the
Ohio Supreme Court as “the ultimate arbiter of the meaning of the Ohio
Constitution,” the opinion did not actually elucidate the meaning of equal
protection in the Ohio Constitution as distinct from the federal equal
protection analysis.121 Without discussion of the text or history of Article
I, Section 2—and citing primarily federal case law—the plurality simply
declared that Ohio equal protection law applied in the midst of finding a
federal equal protection violation.122 In an apparent effort to insulate the
decision from U.S. Supreme Court review, Mole inserted: “[E]ven if we
have erred in our understanding of the federal Constitution’s Equal
Protection Clause, we find that the guarantees of equal protection in the
Ohio Constitution independently forbid [the application of the
statute].”123 But beyond its emphasis on the Ohio Supreme Court’s power
to interpret the Ohio Constitution to provide greater protections than the
federal Constitution, the decision in Mole provided no explanation of
why—in this specific instance—the Ohio Constitution would provide
greater rights than its federal counterpart.

120.
121.
122.
123.

Mole, 74 N.E.3d at 376 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 376-77.
Id.
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In dissent, Justice Kennedy accused the lead opinion of “without any
analysis . . . depart[ing] from [] century-old precedent . . . [and]
stretch[ing] the precedent of this court and that of the United States
Supreme Court to the breaking point.”124 Justice Kennedy pointed to
Arnold as a model of the analysis that Ohio courts ought to undertake in
judicial federalism claims, reasoning that “[b]ased on our precedent, in
order to hold that the Ohio Constitution is more protective than the federal
Constitution, the lead opinion needs to point to some language in Article
I, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution that is different from the language of
the Fourteenth Amendment.”125
This heavy emphasis on textual interpretation presents a different mode
of analysis for Ohio courts to undertake rather than the “prudent-and-notinconsistent” standard espoused by the Mole plurality. Read literally,
Justice Kennedy’s dissent implied that an Ohio court cannot depart from
federal precedent unless it can point to meaningful textual (or historical)
differences between state and federal provisions. While some judicial
federalism scholars reject this assertion,126 it represents a plausible
interpretation of Ohio’s (murky) precedent.127 Moreover, a handful of
post-Mole decisions have pointed to a lack of textual differences between
state and federal provisions as a reason to strip state constitutional claims
of independent force.128 To be sure, the role of text is critically important
(see Part V below), but based on the Mole plurality, in Ohio it is not the
only consideration.
Finally, Justice French’s Mole dissent offers yet another possibility.
Justice French insisted that a finding of greater state-constitution
protections would require “an independent analysis of the equalprotection guarantee in Article I, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution
premised on its language, history, or early understandings” that presents
“compelling reasons why Ohio constitutional law should differ from the
federal law.”129 Although Justice French’s approach avoids the rigidity of
124. Id. at 390 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 392.
126. Saphire, supra note 5, at 460 (citing Brennan, State Constitutions; Thomas Morawetz,
Deviation and Autonomy: The Jurisprudence of Interpretation in State Constitutional Law, 26 CONN. L.
REV. 635, 639-40 (1994)).
127. See, e.g., Saphire, supra note 5, at 459-60 (discussing Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d
203 (Ohio 1999)).
128. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 165 N.E.3d 1123, 1130 (Ohio 2020) (rejecting claim that the Ohio
Constitution’s double jeopardy provision is broader than the double jeopardy provision under the Fifth
Amendment, noting that “[t]he wording of [Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution and the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution] is nearly identical”); Ohio v. Jordan, No. 2020-0495, slip
op. at 7 (Ohio Nov. 9, 2021) (“Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution contains
virtually identical language” as the Fourth Amendment.).
129. Mole, 74 N.E.3d at 398-99 (French, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. Brown, 39 N.E.3d 469,
504 (French, J., dissenting)).
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Justice Kennedy’s, it still requires “compelling” reasons to depart from
federal constitutional law, which would seemingly create a strong
presumption that state and federal constitutional law are coextensive.
And, despite the fact that Justice French rejected the lead opinion’s
interpretation of Article I, Section 2, her opinion itself never grappled
with the “language, history, or early understanding” of that provision and,
thus, provides little practical guidance to courts if they were to apply her
standard.
Although Mole represents the most significant recent judicial
federalism case in Ohio, it generated three contradictory approaches to
judicial federalism (without commanding a majority for any approach).
And even the lead opinion failed to fully explain the standard it was
embracing. Subsequent cases have failed to elucidate matters—at least so
far. Absent more precise guidance from the Ohio Supreme Court, this
creates confusion for lower courts and may encourage the tendency of
collapsing the federal and state constitutional rights. But this then
perpetuates us in the very trap we’re trying to avoid.
B. Challenges for Practitioners
More than one scholar of judicial federalism lays blame for the underdeveloped state constitutional law not on state court judges, but on state
court practitioners.130 After all, the Ohio Supreme Court can hardly be
criticized for a dearth of precedent on state constitutional issues when
Ohio lawyers fail to preserve and brief state constitutional issues.131 But
this road runs both ways: It is hardly fair to ask Ohio litigants to pour
time, effort, and money into developing state constitutional claims when
the prospects of a victory seem tenuous at best. Even where the law
recognizes multiple interpretations, lawyers will make strategic choices
about the claims that they bring based on the signals they receive from the
state’s highest court.132 The Ohio Supreme Court’s signals on judicial
federalism have been mixed at best—and inconsistent at worst.
Richard S. Price described the problem succinctly in his 2015 article,
Lawyers Need Law: Judicial Federalism, State Courts, and Lawyers in
Search and Seizure Cases.133 Price conducted a comparative analysis of
state and federal constitutional law claims over several decades and across
130. Richard S. Price, Lawyers Need Law: Judicial Federalism, State Courts, and Lawyers in
Search and Seizure Cases, 78 ALB. L. REV. 1393, 1405 n. 78 (2015).
131. See, e.g., State v. Dibble, 150 N.E.3d 912, 916, n. 1 (Ohio 2020) (“Curiously, the parties have
not presented any arguments under the Ohio Constitution in this court or in the proceedings below. Thus,
we have no occasion to consider here the protections afforded under Article I, Section 14 of that
document.”).
132. Price, supra note 130, at 1408.
133. Id.
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four states: Ohio, New York, Washington, and Oregon.134 His data
confirmed that, among the four states, Ohio litigants raised the fewest
state constitutional claims.135 This trend held true even in search-andseizure cases where federal claims were clearly doomed to fail: Ohio
lawyers simply did not argue state law claims, or, when they did, they
offered claims that were “[not] well developed” and burdened by
“confusion result[ing] from the court’s own jurisprudence.”136 For Price,
the reason behind this state-law-claim disparity was clear:
The [Ohio Supreme Court’s] consistent refusal to treat the state search
provision independently gave lawyers no guidance on how to make such
arguments or any indication that the court wanted to hear such issues.
Thus, lawyers provided the legal arguments they had been trained to
provide and utilized the law their state courts gave them to work with—
that is, federal constitutional law.137

The results of Price’s study supported the common-sense proposition
that “lawyers need law.”138 Without clear law on how to evaluate their
judicial federalism claims, Ohio lawyers choose—for the most part—
simply not to bring them.
The review of Ohio’s judicial federalism case law in Part II underscores
Price’s point. Even in cases where the Ohio Supreme Court has invoked
judicial federalism to depart from federal precedent, it has consistently
failed to explain why it is doing so, or how whatever standard it espoused
will be applied in subsequent cases. This failure to expound on the court’s
decision-making process impedes future judicial federalism claims in a few
ways.

First, attorneys will be hard-pressed to evaluate their prospects of
success with a state constitutional claim and might hesitate to rely on a
state constitutional claim when advising a client to reject a plea deal or
settlement offer. The impression that state law claims are losers—
accurate or not—likely causes many of those claims to die before they
can reach appellate courts. Richard Saphire, for example, recalls his
enduring impression as a practitioner that the Ohio Constitution was
“quite unlikely to be a source of any robust jurisprudence of individual
rights.”139 In a similar vein, Justice Fisher once wrote that “I do not fault
[the defendant] for failing to raise this issue under the Ohio Constitution.
Indeed, this court’s precedent would discourage even a seasoned attorney

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 1409-11.
Id. at 1427-29.
Id. at 1430.
Id. at 1432.
Id. at 1453.
Saphire, supra note 5, at 443.
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from raising such an argument.”140
Next, the lack of a principled interpretive lens for evaluating judicial
federalism claims prevents effective briefing and argument on claims that
actually are brought. Where is an attorney presenting a judicial federalism
claim supposed to look for support? Case law is relatively unhelpful: the
court’s tendency of false starts in the judicial federalism context renders
the vitality of (already sparse) precedent questionable.141 Constitutional
history might be a good bet, but as discussed above, at least some
members of the court believe that such history is largely irrelevant in the
absence of textual differences between state and federal constitutional
provisions.142 Policy arguments face a similar hurdle: we simply don’t
know whether a majority of the court would treat policy considerations as
relevant to a judicial federalism claim, let alone decisive. Without
direction from the court on how a judicial federalism claim will be
assessed, an attorney’s best course is probably an “everything-but-thekitchen-sink” approach—but this too raises problems. Even a litigant
arguing a single state law claim will be hard-pressed to address all
relevant case law, textual interpretation, constitutional history, and public
policy arguments in the confines of one brief. Litigants bringing multiple
claims (and working with less space) have almost no guidance on how to
triage their arguments.
Practitioners, however, should not despair. The Ohio Supreme Court
has recently suggested an openness to some state constitutional claims—
especially in the equal protection context. Justice Fischer’s assertions that
the Ohio Supreme Court should “reexamine the Ohio and federal Equal
Protection Clauses”143 and that “[p]arties should not presume that rights
afforded to a person under the United States Constitution . . . are the same
rights as those afforded to a person under the Ohio Constitution”144 are
practically a flashing neon sign, saying: “Lawyers, bring your state equal
protection claims here!” And it’s not just Justice Fischer. Where the
parties fail to properly raise an issue under the Ohio Constitution, it has
become commonplace for the Ohio Supreme Court to explicitly “leave[]
open the question whether the Ohio Constitution might offer greater rights
and protections to our citizenry under these circumstances.”145 Language
140. State v. Hackett, 172 N.E.3d 75, 81-82 (Ohio 2020) (Fisher, J., concurring).
141. Consider, for example, the questionable status of the court’s “functional equivalents”
precedent in equal protection claims. Supra Part II.C.2.
142. See supra Part III.A.
143. Stolz v. J & B Steel Erectors, Inc., 122 N.E.3d 1228 (Ohio 2018) (Fischer, J., concurring).
144. Hackett, 172 N.E.3d at 82.
145. State v. Dibble, 150 N.E.3d 912 (Ohio 2020). See also State v. Tidwell, 175 N.E.3d 527, 531
n.1 (Ohio 2021) (“The court of appeals and the argument section of Tidwell's merit brief filed in this court
each made a single reference to Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution. Because the decision below
and the arguments on appeal are based entirely on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, we likewise decide
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of this nature may hint that the Ohio Supreme Court is interested in reevaluating the protections provided by the Ohio Constitution and,
perhaps, interpreting them with independent force. It is time for
practitioners to respond to these hints and advance theories under state
constitutional principles. Since courts generally do not address issues that
the parties did not raise, courts need practitioners to develop these
arguments in order to force courts to explore the protections provided by
the state constitution.
Unfortunately, Ohio’s decades-long flirtation with judicial federalism
has become a self-fulfilling prophecy: Lawyers choose not to bring
judicial federalism claims because they lack clear legal standards to
follow; and this lack of meritorious judicial federalism claims prevents
the court from developing clearer legal standards. The discussion above
on search-and-seizure and equal protection jurisprudence is
representative for how Ohio courts have approached such matters.
While there is no immediate fix for this problem, the time has come to
provide a workable framework with which to analyze state constitutional
claims. In the following Part, we will articulate how a “primacy” model
could help move Ohio toward a more coherent, sustainable form of state
constitutional interpretation. If we force ourselves to evaluate state
constitutional law claims first, it compels us to develop better
methodologies for evaluating those claims, thereby creating a more
sustainable body of caselaw from which lawyers and judges can draw.
V. THE PRIMACY MODEL: OHIO’S PATH TO A COHERENT
APPLICATION OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM
Although some commentators have expressed concern about the
potential for judicial federalism to generate outcome-oriented results, the
alternative—blind adherence to a lockstep approach—represents an
abdication of state sovereignty. States have different constitutional
histories, and often different texts, than the federal constitution. Why
would we conflate these? More importantly, we have positive, empirical
this case on that body of law.”); State v. Hairston, 126 N.E.3d 1132, 1135 n.1 (Ohio 2019) (“The parties
have not presented any argument under the Ohio Constitution; thus, we do not consider whether different
standards might apply under the two provisions.”); State v. Weber, 168 N.E.3d 468, 482 (Ohio 2020)
(DeWine, J., concurring) (“The text of the Second Amendment provides that ‘[a] well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.’ The Ohio Constitution has a similar provision: ‘The people have the right to bear arms for
their defense and security * * *.’ Because Weber bases his arguments on the Second Amendment, and
because the lead opinion analyzes the right under the Second Amendment, I too will limit my focus to the
federal guarantee.”); State v. LaRosa, 179 N.E.3d 89, 95 (Ohio 2021) (“Because [the defendant] offers no
argument specific to the Ohio Constitution and because he does not argue that its protections differ from
those provided by the Fourth Amendment, our analysis focuses on only the Fourth Amendment’s
application in this case.”).
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experience to draw from, with several states applying judicial federalism,
specifically the primacy model, in a consistent, articulable fashion. By
answering the sequencing question (which claim, if any, do we analyze
first) through the primacy model, it enables those courts to devote time
and precision to the ensuing methodological question (how should we
analyze this state constitutional claim?).
Some might question whether it makes sense to tackle the state
constitutional question first if that poses a difficult analysis and the
inquiry under the federal constitution is straightforward. By the same
token, a court may wish to fully engage in the federal constitutional
analysis even if it grants relief under the state (as an alternative holding).
My point here is not to place strict parameters on the primacy model,
because judicial discretion certainly can come into play. Rather, by
adopting a mindset that courts will engage with state constitutional
questions first, we promote an environment whereby such questions
receive considerable attention from lawyers and judges alike. And we
create a body of jurisprudence on the state constitution that is both
thoughtful and engaged but also independent of federal guidance.
To see how this might look in practice, it is helpful to consider the
experiences of some states that have adopted the primacy model.146 For
example, the Delaware Supreme Court has articulated perhaps the most
detailed and systematic version of the primacy model, instructing courts
to consider the following criteria when comparing state and federal
constitutional provisions:
(1) Textual Language—A state constitution's language may itself provide
a basis for reaching a result different from that which could be obtained
under federal law. Textual language can be relevant in either of two
contexts. First, distinctive provisions of our State charter may recognize
rights not identified in the federal constitution. . . .
Second, the phrasing of a particular provision in our charter may be so
significantly different from the language used to address the same subject
in the federal Constitution that we can feel free to interpret our provision
on an independent basis . . . .
(2) Legislative History—Whether or not the textual language of a given
provision is different from that found in the federal Constitution, legislative
history may reveal an intention that will support reading the provision

146. See, e.g., State v. Perry, 610 So.2d 746, 750 (La. 1992) (“Greater judicial efficiency and
coherence are promoted when we address state [constitutional] law issues first.”); State v. Johnson, 719
P.2d 1248, 1255 (Mont. 1986) (“[A] state court always is responsible for the law of its state before
deciding whether the state falls short of a national standard, so that no federal issue is properly reached
when the state's law protects the claimed right.”); State v. Chaisson, 486 A.2d 297, 301 (N.H. 1984) (“We,
of course, address the State constitutional issues first.”); Large v. Superior Court, 714 P.2d 399, 405 (Ariz.
1986) (“In construing the Arizona Constitution we refer to federal constitutional law only as the
benchmark of minimum constitutional protection.”).
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independently of federal law. . . .
(3) Preexisting State Law—Previously established bodies of state law may
also suggest distinctive state constitutional rights. State law is often
responsive to concerns long before they are addressed by constitutional
claims. Such preexisting law can help to define the scope of the
constitutional right later established.
(4) Structural Differences—Differences in structure between the federal
and state constitutions might also provide a basis for rejecting the
constraints of federal doctrine at the state level. The United States
Constitution is a grant of enumerated powers to the federal government.
Our State Constitution, on the other hand, serves only to limit the sovereign
power which inheres directly in the people and indirectly in their elected
representatives. Hence, the explicit affirmation of fundamental rights in
our Constitution can be seen as a guarantee of those rights and not as a
restriction upon them.
(5) Matters of Particular State Interest or Local Concern—A state
constitution may also be employed to address matters of peculiar state
interest or local concern. When particular questions are local in character
and do not appear to require a uniform national policy, they are ripe for
decision under state law. Moreover, some matters are uniquely appropriate
for independent state action. . . .
(6) State Traditions—A state’s history and traditions may also provide a
basis for the independent application of its constitution . . . .
(7) Public Attitudes—Distinctive attitudes of a state’s citizenry may also
furnish grounds to expand constitutional rights under state charters. While
we have never cited this criterion in our decisions, courts in other
jurisdictions have pointed to public attitudes as a relevant factor in their
deliberations.147

Delaware courts have used this guidance to aid in deciding cases. For
example, after independently analyzing each of these factors, the
Delaware Court of Chancery has held that the Elections Clause under the
Delaware Constitution has “independent content” from the Fourteenth
Amendment.148 And in another case, the Delaware Supreme Court applied
these factors to hold that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule
violated Article I Section 6 of the Delaware Constitution.149
The detailed roadmap offered by Delaware courts provides workable
guidance to lawyers and judges alike as they wrestle with state
constitutional questions. In fairness, however, this implicates the
methodological question (how should we interpret our state’s
constitution?) more than the sequencing question (which claim, if any, do
147. Young v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist., 122 A.3d 784, 811-12 (Del. Ch. 2015) (quoting Jones
v. State, 745 A.2d 856, 864-65 (Del. 1999)). These factors are very helpful but they would not need to be
all adopted in this manner by a court applying the primacy approach.
148. Id. at 813.
149. Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 819 (Del. 2000).
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we analyze first?). For that reason, not every state will agree with all
facets of this approach as delineated in Delaware, but adopting the
primacy model forces the state to engage in the debate about how its
constitutional claims should be evaluated. Those methodological
questions can be difficult and divisive, but we should have that debate in
the open.
Utah courts also analyze a wide range of factors when comparing state
and federal constitutional provisions. For example, in West v. Thomson
Newspapers, the Utah Supreme Court considered whether a newspaper
company could be liable for defamation under the free press provisions
of the Utah Constitution.150 The court held that the Utah Constitution
secured broader freedom of press protections than the federal First
Amendment, focusing on the textual differences between the state and
federal constitutions, the legislative history behind Utah’s free press
provisions, and the history of journalistic practices in the state.151 In a
2007 case, the Utah Supreme Court relied on the text of the Utah
Constitution, as well as decisions from other states that use the primacy
model, to adopt a case-by-case inquiry to determine whether the
prosecution’s failure to disclose evidence violates the defendant’s rights
under the due process provisions of the Utah Constitution.152 In reaching
this conclusion, the court rejected the United States Supreme Court’s
opinion in Arizona v. Youngblood, where the Court imposed a burden on
the defendant to show that the prosecution’s failure to disclose was in bad
faith, because the court determined that such a requirement did not secure
“fundamental fairness” and was thus inconsistent with Article I, Section
7 of the Utah Constitution.153
Texas has also demonstrated that the primacy model can be applied in
a workable manner. For instance, in Davenport v. Garcia, the Texas
Supreme Court determined that a gag order violated the Texas
Constitution, concluding that the Texas Constitution secured broader free
speech protections than the federal constitution.154 The court focused on
the history of the text of the Texas Constitution, which the court traced
back to the days when Texas was a Mexican territory.155 Although the
Texas Supreme Court has, more recently, refused to determine whether
Texas’ free speech provisions are more robust than the First Amendment
in cases that do not involve a gag order, Texas courts maintain that “in
interpreting our own constitution, we ‘should borrow from well-reasoned
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1006, 1013 (Utah 1994).
Id.
State v. Tiedemann, 162 P.3d 1106, 1117 (Utah 2007)
Id. (citing Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988)).
Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. 1992).
Id.
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and persuasive federal procedural and substantive precedent when this is
deemed helpful, but should never feel compelled to parrot the federal
judiciary.’”156
These cases confirm that the primacy model, particularly Delaware’s
version of it, can be applied in a consistent and principled manner. These
experiences can provide valuable lessons for Ohio, as guidance from other
states that use the primacy model can help define the contours of our
judicial federalism jurisprudence. In so doing, Ohio constitutional law
may begin to evolve in a way that appropriately safeguards Ohioans’
rights consistent with our constitutional design.
VI. CONCLUSION
Ohio has a rich constitutional heritage,157 and the primacy model would
appropriately honor that history by reinvigorating Ohio constitutional
interpretation. Many of our constitutional provisions differ markedly
from their federal constitutional counterparts.158 Indeed, much of Ohio’s
constitution was influenced by the experience of other states,159
sometimes more so than the federal constitution. It’s past time to give
those differences their due rather than “abdicat[ing] our constitutional
interpretation to Washington.”160
The primacy approach to judicial federalism would compel Ohio courts
to consider the text, history, and purpose of Ohio’s constitutional
provisions first, before turning to the federal constitution. It would shine
a spotlight on all of those areas where courts have treated state
constitutional claims differently without explaining the why or how and
hopefully provide answers to those questions. This practice will help
develop a strong body of jurisprudence around our constitution and
encourage lawyers to frame their constitutional arguments with a statecentric lens. Lawyers and courts, working together, can restore the
independent force of the Ohio Constitution that our founders intended.

156. Kinney v. Barnes, 443 S.W.3d 87, 92 (Tex. 2014) (quoting Davenport, 834 S.W.2d at 20).
157. See generally STEVEN H. STEINGLASS & GINO J. SCARSELLI, THE OHIO CONSTITUTION: A
REFERENCE GUIDE (2d ed. Forthcoming 2022).
158. See, e.g., supra note 60 (citing the text of the First Amendment and Ohio’s analogous
provisions).
159. McClain v. State, No. C-200195, 2021 Ohio App. LEXIS 1401, ¶ 52 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 23,
2021) (Bergeron, J., dissenting) (citing City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115 (Ohio 2006) (using
“out-of-state opinions as guidance in interpreting Ohio’s Constitution.”)).
160. State v. Banks, Nos. C-200395 & C-200396, 2021 Ohio App. LEXIS 4253, ¶ 49 (Ohio Ct.
App. Dec. 10, 2021) (Bergeron, J., concurring).
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